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THE RIGHT TO PICKETTWILIGHT ZONE OF THE CONSTITUTION
Edgar A. Jones, Jr. t
Substantial questions were raised anew by the decision and
opinions in Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen
Plumbers v. Graham,' questions which have proved to be hardy perennials. Does the Court still recognize a constitutionally protected
right to picket? How is such a right to be rationalized and what limitations should be imposed upon its exercise? Indeed, should it ever
have acknowledged such a right to exist?
It would surprise few people and please many if the Court were
finally to resolve these questions by the simple expedient of overruling
Thornhill v. Alabama,' the case that started the whole furor in 1940
by declaring picketing to be a constitutionally protected means for the
communication of ideas. Before the Court may be justified in cutting
off the Thornhill doctrine, however, it would seem that those decisions
which apply this doctrine should reveal a failure to achieve a workable
rationale whereby "the practical administration of labor law" I can be
accommodated to a conception of freedom of expression inclusive of
the right to picket. The impression is widespread that those decisions
failed to do just that.4 "[L]ying on the vague periphery of constitutional right, wherein speech and action are blended," I this form of
expression discerned in the First and Fourteenth Amendments by the
Thornhill Court has been subjected ever since to the undermining effect
of doubts as to its legitimacy.
Without breaching the Thornhill doctrine and the cases which
have amplified it, may the basic issues posed by the Graham case be
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resolved satisfactorily, which is to say, realistically and not merely by
an artificial rearrangement of verbal symbols? The writer would venture to answer that question affirmatively. Indeed, it seems that the
Court has already worked out the essentials of an analysis whereby
picketing may be regulated fairly without jeopardizing its status as
constitutionally-protected activity. It is hoped to demonstrate that
here.6

The gist of the argument is this: (1) by its Thornhill decision
the Court brought union activities under effective federal control at
a time when Congress had not done so and as a matter of political
reality was not apt to do so; (2) simultaneously, it preserved this
medium of expression from unreasonable regulation by making applicable to it "clear and present danger" reasoning; (3) but in its most
recent cases it has not heeded the caution formalized by that reasoning
because it has failed to require that the enjoined activity be sufficiently
linked by cause and effect to the policy insulated by the injunction. In
turn, therefore, we shall consider, first, a recapitulation of the Thornhill
decision and its judicial antecedents; second, how the Court has regulated the exercise of union economic power by its picketing decisions;
third, how the Court, by adapting the "clear and present danger" test
to picketing, has accommodated the economic consequences of effective
picketing to its constitutional status; and, fourth, some concluding
propositions.
I.

An insignificant proportion of the Supreme Court's business is
concerned with labor picketing. It is possible, therefore, to trace the
evolution of the right to picket through only a dozen cases decided
over a thirty-three year period of economic turmoil. Yet these few
cases have effectively set out the metes and bounds of state control
over union combative strength. This is so because the picketer is organized labor's foot soldier. More often than not the fruits of the
strike are won or lost on the picket line. Particularly is this true when
other economic factors do not press management to prompt resolution
of a labor dispute which has erupted into a work stoppage.
As late as 1931 there was serious doubt whether legislative means
might be found to set off an area within which unions might utilize
picketing to further their aims without running afoul of federal con6. See Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Conclu.sion, 39 VA. L. REv.. 1067.
(1953) (hereinafter cited as Gregory, A Conclusion) ; cf. Rudd v. Dewey, 121 Iowa
454, 96 N.W. 973 (1903). See also, Jones, A Jurisprudence of Epithets, supra note
4; Gregory, Picketing and Coercions: A Defense, 39 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Gregory, A Defense) ; Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39
VA. L. REv. 1063 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Jones, A Reply).

19541

THE RIGHT TO PICKET

stitutional provisions.7 The Supreme Court had seemed in Truax v.
CorriganI to reject the possibility of statutory legalization of picketing.
It had done this in the names of "due process" and "equal protection"
with reference to the property rights of the person picketed. Under
the common law of many of the states at that time picketing was
deemed to be tortious despite lack of violence.'
Thus it was thought in 1937 that the Court had relaxed considerably its antipathy to picketing when its judgment came down in Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Union.' Senn, a small nonunion contractor
in Wisconsin who laid tile with the help of two employees, was picketed
by the union when he refused to sign an agreement which would effectively have barred him thereafter from laying tile himself. The
State court refused to enjoin the picketing despite Senn's "due process"
and "equal protection" arguments. In affirming the judgment of the
Wisconsin court, Mr. Justice Brandeis held that the union tactic of
seeking to deny Sen the opportunity to work on his own jobs was not
a deprivation of liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wisconsin had stated that the purpose of the union was lawful; the
Court refused to upset the state's judgment.
Mr. Justice Brandeis saw nothing in the Federal Constitution to
prevent statutory authorization of picketing. In a famous though ambiguous statement, he wrote: "Clearly the means which the statute
authorizes-picketing and publicity-are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Members might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." "
Mr. Justice Brandeis' basic position in Senn was that picketing
was not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. To find no prohibitive mandate in the Constitution obviously is not to find a protective mandate there. Indeed, the Senn holding suggests an interpretation
which hardly could be thought to buttress a constitutional right to
picket. It seems accurate to say that in 1937 picketing was susceptible
7. Chief Justice Taft had written of nonviolent, although verbally abusive,
picketing: "Violence could not have been more effective. It was moral coercion by
illegal annoyance and obstruction and it thus was plainly a conspiracy. . . . A law
which operates to make lawful such a wrong as is described in plaintiff's complaint
[the abuse being viewed as tortious conduct] deprives the owner of the business
and the premises of his property without due process, and cannot be held valid under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921). See
Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C.L. Rav. 158, 185 (1932).
8. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
9. See Gregory, A Defense, supra note 6, at 1054..
10. 301 U.S. 468 (1937). See Gregory, A Defense, supra note 6, at 1058.
11. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937). Compare
Gregory, A Defense, supra note 6, at 1061, with Jones, A Reply, supra note 6, at
1065.
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either to statutory authorization or, by necessary implication, to outright prohibition. That would hardly seem to evidence an equation of
picketing and speech by Mr. Justice Brandeis. "If Wisconsin could
permit such picketing as a matter of policy," said Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in 1950, "it must have been equally free as a matter of
policy to choose not to permit it..

."

'

Whether or not compatible

with the Brandeis dictum, assumed by most to tie picketing to free
speech, it is clear enough that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's conclusion is
in accord with the foregoing analysis of the Senn holding.
But that which in 1937 could have been authorized or prohibited
at the whim of the state legislature became impossible of statutory prohibition rather abruptly in 1940. This striking inversion of premises
was effected by the Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama' when
it found that the Federal Constitution prevented the legislature of
Alabama from prohibiting picketing. This decision elevated the right
to picket to the status of a First Amendment "freedom," imposing
upon the Court the responsibility thereafter of treating a picketer with
the same relative precaution as it does a soapbox speaker, a newspaper
editor, or a Jehovah's Witness.
Despite such ambient phrases as "communication of ideas," "the
right of free discussion," "freedom of discussion," along with citations
of John Milton, the Continental Congress and Mr. Justice Brandeis,
Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a much more guarded opinion than is generally credited to him. By it, he carefully limited this new-found right.
The most important limitation was the applicability of the "clear and
present danger" test. "Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion
can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises
under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas
by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion." "
This right, said the Court, like all rights of employers and employees
to participate in the economic life of society, may be modified or qualified to serve the common good.'3 But there was a caution to be observed. "This is but an instance of the power of the State to set the
limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants. .

.

.

It

12. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 4767 (1950). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), where Alabama chose
not to permit picketing but the choice was rendered nugatory.
13. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Mr. Justice McReynolds was the sole dissenter. It is
interesting to note that Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas and Reed voted with
Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Murphy and Rutledge for the Thornhill
decision. Perhaps it should be added too that it was not Mr. Justice Murphy's
opinion that created the constitutional right to picket; it was the decision for which
the eight justices voted.
14. Id. at 104-5.
15. Id. at 103.
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does not follow that the State in dealing with the evils arising from
industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern." :"
In addition to the "clear and present danger" test, the Court required that in order to be privileged the "discussion" must both be
peaceful and truthful." Further, the Court ruled out instances of
"picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion such
imminent and aggravated danger" to the interests of the state in the
preservation of peace and the protection of its citizens' lives, privacy
and property "as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation giving rise to the danger." 18
This then was the manner and form in which the right to picket
was set in the First Amendment litany. It apparently was viewed as
an aspect of speech. The "clear and present danger" test, as carefully
and fully restated in Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion, was to apply, and
presumably the Court's other speech cases were to constitute precedents
for its picketing cases.
II.
There has always been speculation as to why the Court did what
it did in the Thornhill case.' 9 As with classroom attempts to distinguish disparate cases under one "rule," the hazard to be avoided is
that of an unrealistic and a prioritheoretical pattern superimposed upon
the decisions to justify doctrinaire preconceptions. As might be expected, that hazard is accentuated in an analysis of the Court's labor
picketing decisions.
16. Id. at 103-4.
17. Id. at 104.
18. Id. at 105. Quite aside from the activity of picketing, although sometimes
confused with it, is a pressure device sometimes misleadingly referred to as the
"phantom" or "invisible picket line." Utilized when manufacturing plants are involved which are located on the fringe of population centers, this device consists
simply of a telephone call or letter or conversational notification to other labor
organizations of the fact that "picketing" of the plant has been "declared." Of this
Professor Armstrong observes: "This calls union disciplinary control promptly into
action. Union members are ordered not to deliver goods to or from the picketed
establishment and not to patronize it directly or to buy its products elsewhere.
All this is of course implicit in patrol picketing as well. Equally of course all this
is something quite aside from picketing's free speech aspect." Armstrong, Where
Are We Going With Picketing?, 36 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 32 (1948). This seems also
to be aside from picketing itself. The so-called "invisible picket line" actually has
nothing to do with the activity of picketing. It is an attempt to call into being
sympathetic secondary pressures which, if successfully invoked, would constitute a
secondary boycott. Neither ought it have anything to do with the constitutional
legitimacy of so-called "patrol picketing," insofar as such activity might be encompassed by the right to picket.
19. See, e.g., Gregory ConstitutionalLimitations on the Regulation of Union and
Employer Conduct, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 191, 198 et seq. (1950); Smith, The Supreme
Court and Labor, 1950-1953, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, A.B.A. REP. 21, 24 et seq.
(1954).
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It has been observed that the Thornhill Court may have thought
to achieve a national common law of labor relations."'a If the Court
was so minded in 1940, there could hardly be a better means to attain
this objective than a constitutional right to picket. It could be used to
expand or contract the degree of insulation against state regulation
according to felt necessities expressed in terms of "clear and present
danger" reasoning. In any event, whether or not as a result of such
omniscience, it is the point of this article that that is the present situation.
But it is generally assumed that the regulatory purpose of the
Thornhill Court was a good deal less flexible, that the Justices intended
thereby simply to make the states safe for unions.2" That supposition
has had a great influence on subsequent criticism of the Court's supposed defection from its original position. We may briefly examine
some facts, however, which appear to cast at least enough doubt on
the validity of that assumption as to cause us to reappraise the decisions
for a possible indication of an underriding flexible approach which
hitherto may not have been made explicit.
Consider some of the economic and political factors which existed in 1940 of which the Court was undoubtedly quite mindful.21
Congress in the 1935 Wagner Act 2 2 had deliberately left unions
unhampered by national regulation so as to encourage their growth.
But in 1936 the unanticipated fracture of the AFL and appearance
of the militant CIO upset a basic political assumption of the Wagner
Act. The results were widespread employer-bruising jurisdictional
battles, and the acceleration of the general strengthening of the labor
union movement due, in part, to that competition.3 The imbalance
of national legislation which corralled only employers may have seemed
to warrant by them a kind of rough equalization which would
also assure an effective and continuing adjustment of the
competing interests of labor and management unhampered by local
status quo pressures tending to rigidity. It was not foreseeable
politically when Thornhill was decided in 1940 that Congress
would amend the Wagner Act 24 to take cognizance of the stresses
19a. Gregory, supra note 19, at 197-99.
20. E.g., Gregory, A Defense, note 6 supra, at 1054: "But the Supreme Court
apparently felt impelled to do a hurry-up job of making the entire country safe for
peaceful picketing, both local and interstate."
21. See Gregory, Book Review, 36 VA. L. REv. 409 (1950).
22. 49 STAT. 449 et seq. (1935), 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1946).
23. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 224-8 (rev. ed. 1949).
24. The Smith bill to amend the Wagner Act passed the House of Representatives on June 7, 1940, by a vote of 258 to 129, but died because of Senate inaction.
See Teller, Labor Legislation in the 83d Congress, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, A.B.A.

RaP. 8, 9 (1954).
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and strains caused by this altered structure of union economic power
and industrial strife.. Unless the Court were simply to cloister itself
behind Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,2 5 refusing to do other than apply state
law in picketing cases, the "tour de force implicit in establishing peaceful picketing as a form of speech or communication" 26 may have appeared as a practical necessity in the Holmesian sense 2 7 in order to
assure at least a minimum of coherence in the overall pattern of the
Court's labor decisions.
It would doubtless be thought somewhat novel at this date to
suggest that the Court may have sought by its Thornhill decision not
so much to protect unions 28 but to restrain the more assertive of
them as the Wagner Act restrained unduly aggressive employers. But
the provocation was there2 " and, whatever may have been the state
of mind of the Justices, that does describe accurately the practical and
logical effect of Thornhill as is apparent from the decisions which have
followed it. That decision brought into the area of national control
the conduct of the "other half" of labor-management disputes. It
enabled the Court to review in terms of unlawful conduct--i.e., the
"clear and present danger" test-the efforts of the states to regulate
union conduct in terms of ends as well as means. Because of the decisive importance of picketing to labor in achieving its aims, this
process of allowance and disallowance may indeed have seemed a natural. It ivas probably as good a control situation as could be evolved
by the Court if it felt the need both for some kind of balance in responsibility and a measure of uniformity in regulation. The task was
not too difficult as there was1 precedent of a sort; after all, Mr. Justice
Brandeis had already noted the element of communication in picketing. All the Court had to do was to start looking at picketing through
the Brandeis dictum. It set the focus by means of the Thornhill decision. The process of adjustment of interests thereby made possible
began immediately after the initial establishment of the constitutional
premise and has continued uninterrupted through the most recent of
its picketing decisions.
But, to pin this all down, let us examine the post-Thornhill decisions, stepping temporarily outside the freedom-of-expression prob25. 304 U.S. 64 (1938)> Has the dilemma of the 1940 Court been sufficiently
appreciated as it matched th, 1933 Erie decision against the 1937 Senn precedent?
See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective-Uinion, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
26. Gregory, op. cit. mipra note 23, at 198.
27. HOLmES, THE CommoN LAW 1 (1881).
28. See Gregory, supra note 19, at 198-9. Perhaps I should note that the utility
of this hindsight analysis will turn not so much on whether it describes what did
move the 1940 Court as upon what might move the 1954 Court.
29. See GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 289 et seq.
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lem so that we may view them solely as economic documents. The
cases appear to be divided into two different economic groupings separated by a span of five years (1944-1948) when picketing was not
before the CourtY° The Swing,3 1 Ritter's Cafe,2 Wohl,3

and

Angelos"4

decisions comprise the first group.'
In the Swing case, the state sought to limit the allowability of
picketing to a dispute between the employer and his employees. It
accordingly forbade organizational picketing where the employees did
not wish to join the union. This, the Court held, it could not do. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter expressed it thus:
"A State canriot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of
economic competition between employers and workers so small as
to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.
The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the
same industry has become a common-place. . . . The right of
free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to

workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not
in his employ." "
The decision required that there be some broader measure of allowance
than the relationship of employer and employee. The opinion sug30. Compare Smith, supra note 19, at 28 n.20: ". . . the committee saw in the
1950 decisions a clear indication that the Court's attitude toward picketing had
shifted. ('Picketing can no longer be equated to free speech')." An attritional
effect upon doctrine of changes in personnel could be involved. Chief Justice Vinson
replaced Chief Justice Stone in 1946. Justice Minton came on after the death of
Justice Rutledge in 1949, as did Justice Clark in place of Justice Murphy that same
year. Justice Burton replaced Justice Roberts in 1945.
31. AFL v. 'Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
32. Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722
(1942).
33. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
34. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
35. Although Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) may be read as unduly restrictive of a constitutional
right to picket, it raises problems of violence and police enforcement which set it
apart from this discussion. See also Hotel & Restaurant Alliance v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 437 (1942). Carlson v. California, 310 U.S.
106 (1940), decided the same day as Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), was
substantially a companion decision to the Thornhill case. Not discussed herein
are the following cases: NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665
(1951); NLRB v. United Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951) ; Local 74, Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. NLRB,
341 U.S. 707 (1951); Montgomery Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 (1952).
The second group of post-Thornhill cases to be examined infra are comprised
of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; Hughes v. Superior
Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam,
339 U.S. 532 (1950); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,
341 U.S. 694 (1951); Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers
v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
36. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941) (italics added).
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gested the possibility that the unity of interest of those engaged in the
same industry might be an appropriate measure of allowability.
A year later Mr. Justice Frankfurter had occasion to elaborate
the unity of interest idea he had broached in the Swing opinion. It
became the basis for the decision of Carpenters & Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe.37 He stated the facts and issue briefly:
"In the circumstances of the case before us, Texas has declared
that its general welfare would not be served if, in a controversy
between a contractor and building workers' unions, the unions
were permitted to bring to bear the full weight of familiar
weapons of industrial combat against a restaurant business, which,
as a business, has no nexus with the building dispute but which
happens to be owned by a person who contracts with the builder.
The precise question is, therefore, whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Texas from drawing this line in confining the area
of unrestricted industrial warfare." 38
The doctrine to be drawn from the Swing language and the
Ritter's Cafe decision bears so marked a resemblance to the "labor
dispute" reasoning of cases interpreting the anti-injunction acts " that
some concluded the Court had now incorporated Norris-La Guardia
Act 40 concepts in the First Amendment. 4
What is established at this point is that the Court would not allow
a state to contain picketing within the employer-employee relationship,
but would allow states to prevent unions from ranging combatively
beyond the bounds of interdependence of economic interest. Thus the
Court would permit the state to bar secondary pressure reaching outside the affected industry. Would the Court render vulnerable secondary pressures within the area of economic interdependence?
In the Wohl case,' which arose later that term, the Court indicated that states were not free to proscribe secondary pressures as
such but only those which had repercussions upon the interests of
strangers to the issue. Presumably a stranger was one outside the
bounds of interdependent economic interest. The dispute in Wohl
involved the refusal of self-employed peddlers to conform to union
hours; the picketing was directed at the suppliers and customers (retail
37. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).

38. Id. at 726 (italics added).
39. See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 159 Misc. 806, 813, 288 N.Y. Supp. 855, 863

(Sup. Ct. 1936), rev'd, 250 App. Div. 751, 295 N.Y. Supp. 753 (1st Dep't), inodified,

276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
40. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. .(1946). See particularly 47
STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1946), for "labor dispute" definitions.
41. See Gregory, op. cit. supra note 23, at 200-1; Ratner and Come, The NorrisLa GuardiaAct in the Constitution, 11 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 428 (1943).
42. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
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shops) of the peddlers. By its decision, the Court allowed pressures
to be generated against both the peddlers primarily involved and the
small retailers who dealt with them. These latter, though subjected
to secondary pressure, had an economic stake in the dispute involving
the peddlers and so could be deemed to be in unity of interest with the
disputants. The retailers were not like the owner of Ritter's Cafe who
sought merely to construct a building dissociated from his restaurant
and was not thereby deriving added profit in his business by dealing
with nonunion rather than union people. If these small bakery shops
wanted to avail of a price differential based in part at least on the
lower overhead of nonunion peddlers, they would simply have to put up
an economic fight for it if challenged by the union.
The Angelos case" came up the following year. No secondary
pressure was involved. The union picketed a cafeteria operated by its
owners without any employees. Angelos came off no better than had
Senn six years earlier, but the two cases were differently cast. Both
recognize a legitimate "labor dispute" in the case of a picketed selfemployer, which simply means that the winner is to be determined by
the economic survival of the fittest. But in 1943 the Court said that
the state could not prevent a union from picketing a sole proprietor
to induce him to employ union men despite his contention that he
neither needed nor wanted to hire any help whatsoever. In 1937, on
the other hand, the Court had said there was nothing in the Constitution which precluded a state from allowing such picketing.
Note well the change in the role assumed by the Court. Mr.
Justice Brandeis had declined the role of umpire in 1937. He had instead adopted the attitude of a nonintervening bystander. If the state
wanted to allow that kind of thing, well and good. If it preferred not
to recognize it as lawful conduct, that too was up to it as a matter
of policy. In either event, under the Brandeis reasoning, the Supreme
Court would not substitute itself for the state as the policy formulator.
Of course that was changed in 1940 by the Thornhill decision, which
is why we find the Court thereafter talking and acting like an umpire
rather than looking on as a bystander, the role Mr. Justice Brandeis
had cast for it in 1937.
Four cases and three years after Thornhill, then, we may say that
the Court was actively discharging the responsibility it had assumed
by that decision. The Taft-Hartley Act was still in the unforeseeable
future in 1943 " but the Court in the Swing, Ritter's Cafe, Wohl, and
Angelos decisions had already in fact established a national pattern of
43. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
44. See Teller, supra note 24, at 8 et seq. (1954).
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allowable union conduct which, but for the Thornhill case, it could
not have done. The effect was to protect those employers from harm
who had no economic stake in the dispute in which the picketing union
sought to embroil them. The Court thus set up ground rules of fairness which Congress, even had it been so inclined, may well have felt
politically incapable of achieving in the early Forties.
During the extended lull (1944-1948) in the Supreme Court's
consideration of picketing cases, three major developments in our
economy took place. Unions grew a great deal stronger, in part at
least because of policies of the War Labor Board.4" The Court amplified its conceptions of "interstate commerce" and federal preemption. 4
47
And, in 1947, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.

If the Court in 1940 sought to establish federal control over union
aims and conduct, if it had hoped thereby to work toward a reasonable
degree of fairness and national uniformity in the accommodation of
the competing interests of labor and management, these purposes had
been largely achieved by 1949, initially by the Swing, Ritter's Cafe,
Wohl, and Angelos decisions and, finally, by the enactment in 1947
of the Taft-Hartley Act and its subsequent judicial interpretation in
a setting of relatively unlimited preemptive powers over commerce.
If that were true as of 1949, and still considering the picketing
cases solely as economic documents, it would seem reasonable to expect
the Court to resume its seat in the stands. It would seem equally reasonable to expect that it would not surrender its entitlement to step in
for a bit of relief umpiring should the occasion arise. Whatever may
have been the judicial motivations, it is a fact that the Court's picketing
decisions since that lull have enabled the states (and Congress) to
pursue their own ways undeterred by the Court's Swing through
Angelos decisions. State policy has been frustrated only when deemed
preempted by congressional legislation."
The second post-Thornhill group of cases dealing with state regulation of picketing started off with Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.49 The Missouri Supreme Court had held that picketing could be
enjoined where retail ice peddlers picketed a wholesaler to get an agreement from him not to sell ice to nonunion retail peddlers. The state
court found such an exclusive compact would be in restraint of trade
45. See Gregory, Book Review, 36 VA. L. REv. 409 (1950).
46. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945). Cf. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
47. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAr. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (Supp. 1952).

48. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

49. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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or competition in violation of its antitrust statute. There was no
question but that there was a unity of interest among the parties involved. As a matter of fact, there was a marked resemblance in the
facts to Wohl which had also involved peddlers. But the Court found
an added element here. Mr. Justice Black held the Gibo~iey facts not
disposed of by Wohl because of the presence in Giboney of an "unlawful combination" to violate Missouri's antitrust law.
Of course, the Court could have refused to worry about whether
a state antitrust statute was incidentally violated by a labor union's
pursuit of economic gain within the ambit of unity of interest. Indeed,
because of the element of concerted action in all labor union activity, it
has been suggested that the Court may have indicated to the states
that it might allow the virtual elimination of secondary pressures from
labor-management disputes insofar as picketing effectuates such pressures.5" States then would need only to make findings of restfaint of
trade based on the traditional free trade statutes aimed at both employers and organized employees to render the picketing vulnerable.
If Giboney might have been considered as an isolated phenomenon
because of the free trade policies involved, the Court's May 8, 1950,
picketing decisions completely dispelled any such misconception. Had
Hughes 5 been the sole decision handed down that day, however, it
too might reasonably have been looked upon as limited to its own
special situation, racial picketing. Whether or not a state will allow
the eruptive hazard of racial picketing to exist in local circumstances
ought certainly to be within its police power to determine. "In disallowing such picketing," Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote, "States may
act under the belief that otherwise community tensions and conflicts
would be exacerbated." 52
But there was no mistaking what the Court did in the next two
decisions read that day, both concerning regulation of picketing by the
State of Washington. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the issue in the
Hanke ' case:
50. See Gregory, supra note 19, at 204-5.
51. Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
52. Id. at 464.
53. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470
(1950).
The decision' also disposed of Automobile Drivers & Demonstrations
Union v. Cline, No. 364, also up from the Supreme Court of Washington. In the
Cline case the appellee similarly said that he could not abide by the limitation on
business hours sought to be imposed on self-employer members, withdrew from
membership, and was picketed. Two picketers patrolled peacefully with sandwich
signs stating Cline was "unfair" to the union. In this case, as in Hanke's, a picketer
also wrote down the automobile license of the patrons. But here, in contrast to
Hanke's case, when patrons asked why their licnse numbers were noted by the
picketers, the answer was, "You'll find out." Quaere: whether the two cases were
thereby distinguishable to such a degree as to have warranted separate treatment?
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"The question is this: Does the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution bar a State from use of the injunction to prohibit
the picketing of a business conducted by the owner himself without employees in order to secure compliance by him with a demand
to become a union shop ?" "

...

This was Angelos and, in part, Wohl. But five years of inactivity
had apparently enervated those decisions.
"In those cases, we held only that a State could not proscribe
picketing merely by setting artificial bounds, unreal in the light
of modem circumstances, to what constitutes an industrial relationship or a labor dispute." "I
Although some may feel that to be no more than a judicial flourish,
the writer thinks it quite candidly states what has moved the Court in
Hanke and in the other picketing cases decided from Giboney to date.
Metes and bounds, realistic in 1940-1943, are now unrealistic because
of intervening circumstances. What circumstances? Congress had
brought interstate union activities under the effective control of na-tional legislation in the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Court, in turn, had
assured that state law would not upset the congressional balance. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter told us, by 1950 times had changed, even as
by 1940 the notions of prior decades had become outmoded.
This fact became more apparent as Mr. Justice Minton read his
opinion in the Gazzam case.56
"It is the public policy of the State of Washington that employers shall not coerce their employees' choice of representatives
for purposes of collective bargaining. Do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution permit the State,
in reliance on this policy, to enjoin peaceful picketing carried on
for the purpose of compelling an employer to sign a contract with
a labor union which coerces his employees' choice of bargaining
representhtive?"

57

The Court answered affirmatively and held Washington could
enjoin the union "from endeavoring to compel plaintiff to coerce his
employees to join the defendant union or to designate defendant union
as their representative ,for collective'bargaining, by picketing the hotel
premises of plaintiff..

5

"8

But what about Swing?

"In that

54. Id. at 471.

55. Id. at 479-80.
96. Building Service Employees Int'l Unior v. Gazzani, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).

67. Id. at 533.
58. Ibid.
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case," said Mr. Justice Minton, "this Court struck down the State's
restraint of picketing based solely on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. . . The State has not here, as in Swing, relied on the absence of an employer-employee relationship." In Gazgam the state relied instead on a nonrelational policy. "An adequate
basis for the instant decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing,
namely, coercion by the employer of the employees' selection of a bargaining representative." " Thus, it may still have been possible to
argue that the Court thereby left open the potential of co-existence of
the relational policies it had developed in the earlier cases and the nonrelational policies upheld in Giboney, Hughes, Hanke and Gazzam.
The next case, however, squelched whatever speculative doubts
may have lingered as to the significance of the earlier cases. In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. NLRB,6 the
union had picketed construction sites in protest against the use of nonunion subcontractors. Congress the Court said, sought in Section
8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley amendments to outlaw the secondary boycott.
". . .we recently have recognized the constitutional right
of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do
likewise."

01

This curt dismissal of the first group of post-Thornhill casesbased as they were on a concept of unity of interest which would have
protected this particular pressure-was underscored by citation only
of Giboney through Ga-zam. The IBEW decision confirmed Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's Hanke observation that times had changed.
Another secondary pressure situation, though at the state level,
was presented in the 1953 Graham case."2
"The immediate results of the picketing demonstrated its potential effectiveness, unless enjoined, as a practical means of putting pressure on the general contractor to eliminate from further
participation all nonunion men or all subcontractors employing
nonunion men on the project." '
59. Id. at 539. It has been argued that the Gazzarn decision means that the
states may virtually eliminate organizational pressure by means of picketing. Gregory,
supra note 19, at 203.
60. 341 U.S. 694 (1951) (cited hereinafter as the IBEW decision).
61. Id. at 705.
62. Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345
U.S. 192 (1953).
63. Id. at 201.
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Gazzam gave over to the states the picketer who sought to organize reluctant employees by bringing pressure to bear on their employer.
The Graham pressure involved an extra, though common step. Seeking to obtain work being performed by nonunion workers, the picketers
wanted a general contractor to put pressure, in turn, upon the subcontractors who were hiring nonunion men. This was held violative
of the state's "right to work" statute. Both Graham and Gazzam have
furthered a tendency toward uniformity on a national scale since Congress, with the Court's approval, has covered both situations with regard to ititerstate cases. 64
The first group of post-Thornhill decisions (Swing through Angelos) were disposed of on a relational basis which is not of decisive
significance in the second group (Giboney through Graham). The
unity of interest doctrine, a concept of economic interdependence, was
the leitmotif of the first group. It dogs not appear in the second group.
Of these latter cases, five of the six were decided on nonrelational
grounds. The first (Giboney) involved trade restraint policies, the
second (Hughes) racial discrimination, and three of the last four
(Hanke, Gazzam, Graham) appear to reflect a current concern for individual freedom in the face of union group pressures which may
eventually become more clearly recognizable as a pattern if a counterpoint like Ritter's Cafe becomes available to the Court. Only in the
IBEW case was there required of the Court the kind of policy decision
on a strict relational basis comparable to the earlier group.
The cases in the first group-Swing, Ritter's Cafe, Wohl, Angelos-suggest the effectiveness of the Court's picking and choosing,
affirming and reversing, among state picketing policies. That the
Court in the second group-Giboney, Hughes, Hanke, Gazzam,"
Graham-has had occasion only to affirm state restrictions does not
seem to lessen the effect of its national umpirage. Further, although
the times havechanged so as to render the first group of cases outdated, it should be noted that despite the obvious inconsistency of the
second group of cases with the first group, the Court has not overruled
the first group of cases. Indeed, its express basis of distinction in
Hanke-modern circumstances-preserves their precedent value in the
event that the fortunes of industrial warfare suggest that they again
be called up for active duty.
In Gazzam and Graham the Court as umpire allowed states to
parallel Congress, as may be seen by its Taft-Hartley decisions in the
64. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1952). See Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co.,
341 U.S. 665 (1951); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675 (1951); IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951).
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Garner" and IBEW 6 6 cases. But in Hanke, it allowed the state a
more constrictive policy than Congress has yet seen fit to adopt for
interstate industries.
This suggests that the Court may not have retreated from any
earlier impulsiveness as has so generally been assumed.67 It is inferable, from the course of decision at least, that the Justices who voted
for Thornhill projected fairly clearly where they might go from that
initial landmark. Indeed, the "retreat" which has been deplored or
cheered, according to the promptings of conviction, may thus be more
apparent than real, a withdrawal from a position hypothecated by its
critics rather than established by its decisions. And, as the Court reminds us periodically, it is the decisions that count.. 8
Yet, from the beginning, the Thornhill decision has been summarily dismissed as an egregious blunder. When one reads again the
caustic criticism of that "unguarded opinion" 69 which has been thought
to be so laughable to knowing union men, 70 one wonders who has had
the last laugh after all, the hardheaded union men and professors or
hardheaded jurists.
Thus, in sum, by its Thornhill decision the Supreme Court took
over exclusive control of intrastate as well as interstate labor cases involving picketing. It thereby assumed the power to foreclose state
regulation of picketers to whatever degree it might find required by the
Justices' view of the economy. The Court as a result has formulated
policy as much or more by its negative self-restraint in the face of state
regulation as by its positive intervention to make picketing immune to
particular restraints. There is always in the background the power under Thornhill to stop particular state encroachments on the utilization
of picketing pressures.
As a result, a national pattern of allowability has emerged which
appears to reflect the current trend toward increased constriction of
union power. It may be that this over-emphasizes the national pat65. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
66. IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
67. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 4, at 486; Gregory, A Defense, supra note 6,
at 1057; Jones, A Jurisprudence of Epithets, supra note 4, at 1033; Smith, supra
note 19, at 27.
68. See Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke,'339 U.S. 470, 480 n.6 (1950).
69. Corwin, supra note 4, at 486.
70. "The writer has heard workingmen laugh aloud at these decisions [Thornhill, Carlson, Wohl] when the ground of the decisions was made clear to them.
A reaction more articulate than these laughs, but based upon the same very sensible
notions, is . . . [Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J.
709 (1940).' 2 CROSS=cy, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
See Gregory, A" Defense, supra note 6, at
THE UNITED STATES 1258 n.36 (1953).
1056.
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tern-setting effect of the Court's allowance of state curtailments. But
it is generally recognized that states are prone to exercise the full poential of control over labor union activity left to them by Congress or
the Court. Be that as it may, the Court is assured flexibility for its
consideration of future picketing cases through the approach suggested
in Hanke: Has the state set up bounds which are realistic in the light
of contemporary economic facts of life? 71 Its preservation as prec71. See text at note 55 .supra. In one way or another this statement from
Hanke seems to hold the key to the Court's picketing analysis. But it could be that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter may have meant something less sweeping in that sentence
than is at first apparent. The post-Thornlhill unity of interest doctrine was designed
at least as much to protect neutrals against unreasonable involvement as to allow
unions to pursue their economic self-interest within reasonable bounds. Perhaps
even more weight should be given to the former than to the latter. The Court may
in those cases have set just the outer limits beyond which unions were always to be
vulnerable to picketing injunctions without concern for any policy thereby served
other than that which was protective of neutrals in the relational terms of "labor
dispute" as construed by the Court. It does not necessarily follow that the Court
at the same time set inner limits within which union picketers were never to be
vulnerable to injunctions issued to protect other economic or social policies. It
may be that the Court assumed that within that relational area where unions were
to be immune to regulation based only on industrial realtionships they could still
be curbed in deference to other policies not couched in relational terms. May it then
be argued that the second group of post-Thornhill cases is therefore consistent with
the first? The basic contention would be that, once having corralled the unions
to protect neutrals, the Court continued thereafter within that area to curb union
power wherever its manifestation by picketing threatened to upset nonrelational
policies of legitimate concern to the states and Congress. (The writer is indebted to
Professor Allan McCoid for the suggestion of the possibility of this line of reasoning.)
Does this argument stub its appeal, however, on the Hanke and IBEW cases?
It may be argued that in the earlier Swing, Wol, and Angelos cases the Court
focused only on the circle--drawing of the state-the area of privileged picketing
could not be constricted to the employer-employee relationship; that the presence of
the self-employer was simply a point of departure for a relational analysis and was no
more determinative of the result than if there had been involved a typical stranger
picketing case setting union picketers against nonunion workers and their employer;
that, in contrast, in Hanke the Court focused actually upon the social utility of
a policy protective of self-employers as such because that was the state policy at
issue rather than the relational policy of. the earlier cases. This line of argument
finds substantial support in the statement by Mr. Justice Jackson in the Woh
opinion that, "The respondents say that the basis of the decision below was revealed
in a subsequent opinion of the Court of Appeals, where it was said with regard to
the present case that 'we held that it was an unlawful labor objective to attempt
to coerce a peddler employing no employees in his business . . . to hire an employee...' . . . But this lacks the deliberateness and formality of a certification, and was uttered in a case where the question of the existence of a right to free
speech under the Fourteenth Amendment was neither raised nor considered."
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774 (1942).
But see Gregory, supra note 19, at 203-4.
Further, Mr. Justice Minton, in distinguishing Swing in the course of his
Gazzam opinion, used language which would appear to strengthen this line of reasoning. "Petitioners insist that the*Swing case, Yupra, is controlling. We think not.
In that case this Court struck down the State's restraint of picketing based solely
on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. An adequate basis for the
instant decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the
employer of the employees' selection of a bargaining representative. Peaceful
picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by the decree under review. The
State has not here, as in Swing, relied on the absence of an employer-employee relationship." Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539 (1950).
But what of IBEW? There the policy clearly was relational; secondary boycotts, as such, were outlawed. Did sustaining that congressional policy violate the
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edents of its earlier picketing cases-Swing through Angelos-supports this analysis of what the Court has done, and continues to do, in
its reaction to the economic consequences of picketing.
This may or may not be sound economic technique. It may or
may not be thought to embody a wise theory of governance. But was
it not rendered inevitable by the Court's acknowledgment in Thornhill
of the freedom of expression issue which is inextricably present in these
cases since they involve peaceful persuasion with economic consequences? Examination of the development and application of the
"clear and present danger" test in the picketing decisions may suggest the answer to that question.
III.
In sketching the outline of the constitutional right to picket, Mr.
Justice Murphy explicitly made applicable to it the "clear and present
danger" test spelled out in the speech cases. 72 The Justices (and their
critics) have since been troubled by the right to picket because of an
apparent feeling that accommodation to it of this aspect of the reasoning
of the free speech cases has not been very satisfactory.
The "clear and present danger" formula is essentially a refinement
of the concept of unlawfulness which any society sets against the activities of its citizens individually or in groups. It adds the requisites
of imminence and substantiality of adverse consequence to the common
good, and at the same time requires that the activity which is deemed
undesirable must also involve substantial consequence to the commonweal. Thus, it is said by the Supreme Court that there must be
a finding of substantial evil' as well as a finding that the conduct
sought to be barred constitutes a "clear and present danger" of effectuating that evil. 74 The wisdom of that twofold skepticism ' suggests
Court's own pre-Taft-Hartley national policy protective of neutrals otherwise embroiled by industrial warfare? It would seem that it did inasmuch as the Court's
policy was not antagonistic to secondary boycott as such, but only those which
reached beyond the area of unity of economic interest. Cf. Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 307 (1937). That the IBEW decision was inconsistent
with the Court's earlier relational cases is indicated further by Mr. Justice Burton's
omission of those cases from his citation of authority and inclusion instead of the
decisions-Giboney through Gazzain--which might, but for the IBEW decision, be
distinguished as indicated in this footnote so as to leave the Court's consistency above
reproach. Of course, some doubt that the Court would be fulfilling its constitutional
responsibility if it were not periodically inconsistent.
72. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-4 (1940). See the detailed discussion in Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the FunctiM of Courts, 65 HAv.
L. REv. 1 (1951). But compare Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial
Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1952).
73. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring opinion).

74. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
75. This article does not purport to probe the policy and doctrinal factors
of the "clear and present danger" reasoning, as such. It is concerned with it only
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that the Court scrutinize the policy invoked as*justification for the repression so as to be assured that, if free expression does thwart that
policy, grave harm may result and not mere annoyance.76 The other
phase of its inquiry raises the question whether or not the particular
activity challenged constitutes a "clear and present danger" of effectuating the harm apprehended.

7

7

It seems that it would be an unreal simplification to suggest that
the Court either does or can (or should) strictly compartmentalize
these two phases of its inquiry. It would seem inevitable that the Court
would to some degree balance the requisites of evil and danger relatively
-the more grave the former, the less pressing need be the latter, and
vice versa-in order to attain a satisfactory result in specific circumstances. 78 Thus, while the evil-danger dichotomy seems to have analytical utility for purposes of clarity, it is hardly to be thought of as a
mechanistic contrivance for decision. It is a means for expressing a
composite of value preferences. 79 From them has evolved the prevailing attitude of judicial skepticism of justifications advanced in support
of encroachments on freedom of expression. Preferences among notions of residual state power and the proper scope of federal power, 0
of the relative detachment and competence of the federal and state
judiciary, of the proper relation of courts and legislatures in determining policy,"1 of economic and societal wisdom, of philosophical conceptions of man and society, and more, are involved. Perhaps the most
articulated preference reflected by the evil-danger dichotomy is that
which adopts a market place rather than a hothouse concept of the discovery and propagation of truth."2 It is a belief that ideas which are
tested and survive and grow in an atmosphere of freedom will be more
reflective of truth and thus more beneficial to humanity than those
so far as is necessary to demonstrate its adaptation to the right to picket. The "test"
has already been subjected to detailed and penetrating analysis. See CHA E , FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); Richardson, supra note 72; Rostow, supra
note 72.
76. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (dissenting
opinion) ; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
77. See Richardson, supra note 72, at 6 et seq.
78. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951); United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (per L. Hand, J.).
79. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946) ; FREuxD, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREmE CounT

27 (1949).

80. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
81. See Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court,
50 YALE L.J. 1319 (1941) ; Richardson, supra note 72, at 43 et seq.; Rostow, supra

note 72.
82. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)

(dissenting opinion).
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nurtured under the artificially created protection of political favoritism.m
The attitude of judicial skepticism of restrictions which is the
product of such considerations as these seems well nigh impossible of
reduction to the compass of doctrine other than in terms of an abiding
caution in the accommodation of particular interests competing under
particular facts in particular cases.' If this be a realistic statement of
the "clear and present danger" test in action, it would seem that in
criticizing the cases we should look more for that caution than for strict
analogue. That at least is the basic critical assumption which underlies
the analysis to which we now turn. The Court's adaptation of the
"clear and present danger" reasoning to the right to picket will be
examined, first, in terms of the element of substantial evil and, second,
in terms of the element of clear and present danger.
THE ELEMENT OF SUBSTANTIALITY

Our examination of the picketing cases as economic documents
suggests that the substantial evil element of the "clear and present
danger" test, as it has been applied to labor picketing, may be phrased
in terms of the question suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Hanke: Has the state set up bounds which are realistic in the light of
contemporary economic circumstances?
Since the necessity of decision requires the Court to make basic
policy adjustments in our economy, and since it must make them not
on the narrow ground of economics but with a view of all the social
disciplines helpful to governance, it seems unrealistic to say that the
Justices are thereby arrogating unto themselves policy decisions belonging to the legislatures."
The Court has been explicit in recent picketing opinions, however,
in abjuring any intent to rule on the "wisdom" of the particular policy
83. See, e.g., the much quoted MILToN, ARzEOPAGITICA 51-52 (Hales ed. 1917).
See also L. Hand, J., in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y.

1943):

".

.

. the interest protected by the First Amendment...

presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."
84. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524, 525 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
85. "Sooner or later the conflicts in the economic and social world result in litigation before the Court. De Tocqueville, in 1832, . . . had the discernment to see
what later writers have so often not seen that by the very nature of our Constitution
practically every political question eventually, with us, turns into a judicial question.
The question may become somewhat mutilated in the process, but come before the
Court it will." Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Knomt, 39 VA. L. REv. 883, 895
(1953). A picturesque expression of this idea had appeared many years earlier in
England. "[F]or the sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up in the ashes
of the law." FINCH, A DEsc~asTioN OF THE COmmoN LAW, quoted in DOOLAN, ORDER
AND LAW xvii (1954).
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adduced in support of a ban on expression.
it typically in the Gazzam opinion:

Mr. Justice Minton stated

"To judge the wisdom of such policy is not for us; ours is
but to determine whether a restraint of picketing in reliance on
the policy is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights protected
from state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment." 80
But when may it be said that a restraint is "unwarranted"? How
can the Court decide if a policy comprehends a "substantial" evil if it
does not, to some extent at least, "judge the wisdom of such policy"?
The Court has said that it does not suffice that just any sort of policy
conception be discerned behind the restraint. More is required of the
policy makers. Their policy must comprehend a "substantive evil of
such magnitude as to mark a limit to the right of free speech"; 87 it
must not be "an effort to outlaw only a slight public inconvenience or
annoyance." I8 Can a distinction be maintained in practice which proposes that the Court need not agree that the evil apprehended by the
regulation is a sound policy conception, but need only rule on whether
the conception is reasonable? Can the Justices actually break down
the complex of value judgments involved in a case so as to isolate and
render impotent preferences stimulated by views of the wisdom of the
policy? It should be clear enough that deciding not to decide on the
wisdom of the policy is every bit as decisive, but a good deal less informed. Further, refusal to judge the wisdom of a policy would
narrow the scope of the "dear and present danger" skepticism as a
practical matter by eliminating substantiality as an element. Unless
the Justices are simply to blindfold themselves to reality in some such
manner, they may overlook but they cannot avoid the fact of value
judgments which assess the wisdom of the policy and are expressed in
terms of a decision on the issue of substantiality.
But it will be observed by some that there is usually a "middle
ground" where wise men may differ on the advisability or applicability
of a given policy, and that the Court should not superimpose its own
choice upon the states or Congress in such circumstances. The vital
question, however, is: Whose plat will determine the-boundary lines
of that middle ground? Obviously, the Court's. And so we are back
to the necessity of choice. But there is more to it than that.
86. Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539
(1950).
87. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775
(1942).
88. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
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It would be quite unrealistic to believe that the judicial abnegation
which we are analyzing is no more than a verbal concoction. The
picketing cases do indicate, it is true, that the Court has not appeared
to be so inhibited in decision when it has felt the state policy to be unwise. 9 Therefore, it may be that this abnegation insulates the state's
wisdom, but it does not appear to protect its unwisdom. What could
be irony, however, is a description of a judgmatic fact, a felt restraint
on the part of the Justices. Thus, a decision by the Court that a given
policy is within the insulated area of that middle ground may mean that
the Court is satisfied, perhaps, not so much of the presence of wisdom
as of the absence of unwisdom. There is a difference, however subtle,
and it is an important one because it involves the indefinable and variable degree of judicial restraint exercised by the Justices as they weigh
the policy formulation before them. It would seem that that middle
ground of judicial forebearance would expand or shrink in area, would
be more or less accommodative of state or congressional policy, according to whether a Justice addressed the issue of substantiality mindful
of rejecting unwisdom or intent upon assuring wisdom. The former
meaning may fairly be ascribed to the "not for us" statements in the
Court's picketing opinions, and they are then a sensible and realistic
commentary. If it were otherwise, they would be absurd.
Thus far, the Court has not allowed states to enjoin peacefully
conducted picketing where it has found that the state policy sought
to limit labor picketing (1) to a dispute between an employer and his
employees; " (2) to cases involving a "labor dispute" as defined by
state statutes; 91 or (3) so as to insulate a self-employer against union
organizational pressure. 2 These are the decisions which, with the
counterpoint of Ritter's Cafe, 3 established the unity of economic interest doctrine as a measure of allowable State policy. After these decisions, on the theoretical level at least, there was a national pattern
of allowability of picketing pressure which was geared to "labor dispute"
concepts. These cases seem to embrace within the concept of substantial evil any attempts to embroil in the economic pressures generated by
the picket line members of the general community-"neutrals"--outside the area of economic interdependence in which the dispute arose.
89. See AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Bakery & Pastry Drivers &
Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) ; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293 (1943).
90. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
91. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
92. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
93. Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).

19541

THE RIGHT TO PICKET

It wasn't until 1949 that an occasion arose in which the*Court
was called upon to uphold a state policy expressed in other than the
relational terms of a "labor dispute." A series of five decisions have
come down since then, however, in which the Court has allowed peacefully conducted picketing to be enjoined in circumstances where the
state " policy at issue was expressed in terms of (1) a conventional
trade restraint statute; 95 (2) judicial rejection of discriminatory racial
picketing; "1 (3) judicial insulation of a self-employer against the union
organizational pressure of picketing; 97 (4) and (5) statutes insulating
freedom of association or nonassociation of individual workers against
employer interference." Of these five, the last three cases appear to
reflect concern for the freedom of the individual who is subjected to
group economic pressures. Of course, it is quite clear from these decisions that the Court has, for now at least, deserted the relational
policies it formulated through the earlier cases. Should the Court ever
feel the need to revert to them, it need merely invoke Mr. Justice
0
Frankfurter's Hanke 99 formula.10
94. IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951), concerned the Labor-Management
Relations Act bar on secondary boycotts, 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§158(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1951).
95. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See AnnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Weber, 33 LAB. RE. REP. 2519 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1954) (anti-trade
restraint policy invoked, citing Giboney, where picketing to force employer to agree
to grant subcontracts only to employers organized by picketing union).
96. Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
97. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470

(1950).

98. Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345
U.S. 192 (1953) ; Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532

(1950).

99. The Hanke decision seems clear enough, but the opinion as a whole is
somewhat difficult to assimilate. Indeed, the case reminds one of Chesterton's little
friend who said to her mother, "I think I should understand if only you wouldn't
explain." Recently, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has given us an engaging sketch in
which we may incidentally glimpse the germinative potential of such expressions as
appeared in the course of the Hanke opinion. See Frankfurter, supra note 85, at
904. If picketing is a "hybrid," as he tells us in the Hanke opinion, one gets the
distinct impression that it is a unique variety he has set to seed. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950).
An interesting and noteworthy aspect of the post-Thornhill cases is Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's apparent fixation on the Sen case. One almost gets the feeling that
he is pointing for a sub silentio overruling of Thornhill and reinstatement of Senn.
It seems, however, to be a matter of either/or; presumably the Court cannot at the
same time maintain two valid precedents, one saying the Constitution does not prevent
a state allowing or prohibiting picketing as it chooses (Senn), the other saying the
Constitution does prevent a state allowing or prohibiting picketing as it chooses
(Thoruhill). But the Justice is apparently loath to commit Senn to the constitutional historians. Indeed, he persists in applying artificial respiration when hope
should decently surrender.
In his second post-Thoruhill opinion he quoted as authority the outmoded and
ambiguous Brandeis dictum: "Members of a union might, without special statutory
authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of
speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468, 478." AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941).
See Gregory, supra
note 19, at 199. In the Angelos case, he again quoted that dictum, now as a rule,
and, indeed, hinged the post-Thornhill cases on Senn rather than Thornhill: "Later
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Insofar as the issue of substantiality is concerned, then, it is hard
to see these decisions as flouting any reasonable concept of caution deducible from the "clear and present danger" reasoning previously analyzed. They were not simply ruses for whittling union power or for
banning appeals for public support of union causes. Nor do any of
them appear to reflect undue sensitivity to unwelcome or controversial
opinions. All involved matters of serious concern to the states. Yet
these decisions have been taken as having opened a Pandora's box of
repressive state policies. Thus, for example, it is said:
cases applied the Senn doctrine by enforcing the right of workers to state their
case and to appeal for public support in an orderly and peaceful manner regardless
of the area of immunity as defined by state policy. A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S.
321; Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769. To be sure, the Senn case related to the employment of 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity.' 301 U.S. at
482." Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943). Then in
the Hanke case came an express avowal of state power utterly inconsistent with the
Thornhill precedent but quite consistent with the Senn decision:
"Here we have a glaring instance of the interplay of competing social-economic
interests and viewpoints ...
"Whether to prefer the union or a self-employer in such a situation, or to seek
partial recognition of both interests, and, if so, by what means to secure such accommodation, obviously presents to a State serious problems. . . . That the solution of
these perplexities is a challange to wisdom and not a command of the Constitution
is the significance of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union. . . . In rejecting the
claim that the restriction upon Senn's freedom was a denial of his liberty under
the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court held that it -lay in the domain of policy for
Wisconsin to permit the picketing: 'Whether it was wise for the State to permit
the unions to do so is a question of its public policy-not our concern.' 301 U.S. at
481.
"This conclusion was based on the Court's recognition that it was Wisconsin,
not the Fourteenth Amendment, which put such picketing as a 'means of publicity
on a par with advertisements in the press.' 301 U.S. at 479. If Wisconsin could
permit such picketing as a matter of"policy it must have been equally free as a matter
of policy to choose not to permit it and therefore not to 'put this means of publicity
on a par with advertisements in the press.' If Wisconsin could have deemed it wise
to withdraw from the union the permission which this Court found outside the ban
of the Fourteenth Amendment, such action by Washington cannot be inside that
ban." International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, supra at 475-7.
These attentions to Senn have been accompanied by corresponding snubs of
Thornhill in the opinions. Thus, you will find the "Senn doctrine" in the Angelos
opinion but you will not even see Thornhill cited there; and in Hanke, Thornhill
barely gets a perfunctory nod before the Justice gets down to work on Senn again.
This somewhat novel form of artificial respiration may revive Senn, but it will
surely be fatal to Thornhill.
It was indeed Wisconsin that allowed picketing in 1937. Also, that state in 1937,
as the Justice notes, could as readily have barred picketing. But Alabama couldn't
when it tried in 1940, and that is the crux. "The starting point is Thornhill's case,"
said the Justice before his attempt to revive Senn became evident. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
He might better have said that Thornhill's case was the turning point. In fact, it was
an about-face.
This seems like a devious way of achieving what the Court can do just as well
and with much more becoming candor simply by accepting Thornhill v. Alabama as
its "starting point" and letting the Seam case descend respectfully into historical footnotes. Surely, Mr. .Justice Brandeis would have been the last to object to such a
requiem.
100. "In those cases, we held only that a state [or Congress] could not proscribe
picketing merely by setting artificial bounds, unreal in the light of modern circumstances .... ." International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S.
470, 479-80 (1950).

1954]

THE RIGHT TO PICKET

"Certainly if the states are allowed to stop picketing indirectly,
by making its objectives unlawful for tradesmen, then they should
be able to do it by placing restrictions directly on unions ...
Quite inevitably, the Thornhill doctrine is being pushed back to
its only logical application-a sanction against blanket prohibitions
aimed at all peaceful picketing. There it will remain a monument
to the Court's 'good will,' causing little trouble to state and federal
legislatures who know what they want." 101
No doubt it is possible to use the second group of decisions inductively to construct syllogisms which might appear to demolish the
constitutional right to picket or at least so drastically crimp it as to
limit its effectiveness to a sanction against blanket prohibitions. But
that kind of "logical application" seems to be precisely the type of misapplication of logical principles to data which has given syllogistic reasoning a bad name. While it is true that the Court could construct a
logical framework which would all but efface Thornhill, the question
whether it will do so is not to be answered in terms of logical potential
but, again, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words, "in the light of modem
circumstances."
A dogmatic conclusion of the Court's present attitude toward the
allowable scope of state policy is impossible. But it may at least be
said that analysis of the picketing decisions as instruments of contemporary economic policy supports an inference that the Court may or
may not have loosened but it certainly has not dropped the reins curbing state labor regulation in terms of picketing. It seems premature
to say that Thornhill has been cast aside; the writer believes it would
prove to be costly error for legislators, judges, or employers formulating
labor relations policy to assume that the Court will now brook almost
any restriction of picketing which local temper dictates. Of' course,
the Court would cut the limb behind me by overruling Thornhill, but
it seems more likely that it will continue to utilize the umpirage that
precedent affords rather than lop it off. After all, why should it
overrule Thornhill? State regulation has certainly not been rendered
impotent by the "clear and present danger" reasoning which Thornhill's
existence assures. And the Court has a good deal more flexibility in
solving difficult labor law problems with it than it would without it.
But. does the foregoing reasoning leave Thornhill as a hollow"monument to the Court's 'good will' toward freedom of expression"?
On the contrary. It will become apparent, however, that it is in the
other phase of the "clear and present danger" test-probing the actual
danger to the state's policy of the particular activity challenged-that
101. Gregory, supra note 19, at 204, 205.

See id. at 203.
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the vitality and importance of Thornhill is to be found. Contemporary
economic and political realities are such that the Court's picketing cases
are not so apt to be resolved on the basis of justifiability of state policy.
Recent cases indicate that the decisions may turn instead on whether
the Court gives close or casual attention to the connective element of
actual danger-"clear and present"-linking the particular activity enjoined to the particular policy to be protected.
THE ELEMENT OF DANGER

Close attention to the other element of the "clear and present
danger" test requires that the Court be satisfied both of primary and
of ultimate effectiveness. This means that it should have been demonstrated for the Court that the expression challenged can and will, unless enjoined, both gain the concurrence of others and, in turn, thereby
endanger the policy to be protected.
The usual picketing case differs from the usual speech case in this
regard. Almost invariably, at least in those cases which reach the
appellate courts, effectiveness of the picketers' appeal for concurrence
has been demonstrated. Objective data are readily procurable. Percentages of profits lost, or of workers quitting projects, for example,
afford the courts reliable evidence of the impact of the picket line. For
"clear and present danger" purposes, however, such evidence should
not complete the case. It sets up proof only of primary effectiveness.
It shows that the picketing is effective in that viewers have responded
favorably to the picketers in significant numbers. But significant of
what? That question must be answered through another. Is this primary effectiveness likely to result in the ultimate violation of the preferred policy? The cases indicate that these two stages of effectiveness
should be carefully differentiated. Whether the picketing challenged
has been primarily effective in gaining concurrence, and, if so, whether
there is a real threat that it will also be ultimately effective against the
policy, are separate questions of fact to be resolved in the circumstances
of each case. The caution formalized by the "clear and present danger"
test imposes upon the Court the responsibility of insisting that both
facets of effectiveness be proven to exist. Thus, primary effectiveness
alone does not justify barring picketing. The effect on the viewers
must, in turn, be found to endanger maintenance of the policy.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his Wohl concurring opinion made an observation which highlights this phase of our analysis.
"If the opinion in this case [Wohl] means that a State can
prohibit picketing when it is effective but may not prohibit it
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when it is ineffective, then I think we have made a basic departure
from Thornhill v. Alabama...

"10

If we assume that the Court has already decided the issue of substantiality in favor of the state's policy, it would appear that prohibition
of effective and protection of ineffective picketing is exactly what the
Court did mean in Thornhill (policy frustration), if what we are talking
about is ultimate effectiveness. On the other hand, if it is to primary
effectiveness (viewer concurrence) that the Justice refers, prohibition
would be a departure from Thornhill unless the primary effect of viewer
concurrence were linked causally to the ultimate and forbidden effect
of policy frustration.
An examination of Giboney, Gazzam, and Graham will point up
these distinctions.
In Giboney, the Court accepted the state definition of unlawful
activity: a compact between a wholesaler and union retailers exclusive
of nonunion retailers. This met the necessity for a serious substantive
evil under the "clear and present danger" test. The Court concluded
that the picketing should be regarded as clearly and presently in danger
of effectuating that evil because the picketing had the assurance of success in that regard. It was initially effective. There was an 85 percent reduction in business. It seems clear that the primary effectiveness would have driven the company to do just what would violate
the statute: sign the agreement. The state was able to control an instance of peacefully conducted picketing because the Court allowed it
to only after inquiry into the nature and the gravity to the state of
the effect of the activity forestalled by the injunction. The Court
found that the state's "enforcement of its antitrust laws cannot be classified as an effort to outlaw only a slight public inconvenience or annoyance." 103 It then found the requisite causal connection between the
primary effectiveness of the picketing and the policy the state sought
to preserve. "There was clear danger, imminent and immediate, that
unless restrained, appellants would succeed in making that policy a
dead letter insofar as purchases by nonunion men were concerned." 104
From the moment of its conception, the Thornhill doctrine carried the seed of Giboney 105 simply because the latter represents no
more than a careful application of the "clear and present danger" test.
The vigor of the constitutional right to picket will not be sapped so
102. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775
(1942) (concurring opinion).
103. Giboney v.. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
104. Id. at 503.
105. But see Gregory, supra note 19, at 201.
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long as the Court is cautious in applying that test. The degree of
caution exemplified by Giboney requires, first, that the "evil" foreseen,
the bad effects produced by picketing interdicting a good policy, be
substantial and not fanciful; second, that the picketing be primarily
effective (viewer concurrence); and third, that the primary effectiveness be so proximately linked to the effectuation of the "evil" that allowance of the activity raises an "imminent and immediate" threat of
nullifying the policy (ultimate effectiveness).
Was Gazzam decided in accordance with these principles deducible
from Thornhill and Giboney? It is not at all clear whether the picketing had resulted in a decrease in the Inn's business, merely "embarrassed" it, or had no effect whatsoever upon it. This goes to the
issue of primary effectiveness. The Washington Supreme Court indicated only that:
"Shortly after the picketing started, a laundry which had cared for
appellant's needs, and whose employees belonged to the union, refused to work for appellant. Appellant then attempted without
success to do his own laundry." "'
There is no indication whether or not other laundry service was in fact
available to the Inn, nor, for that matter, whether the refusal of the
laundry was actually attributable to the picket line or to knowledge of
the dispute gained by other means or for reasons unconnected with
the dispute. Yet without factual demonstration of primary effectiveness how can the Court appraise the activity, even cursorily, let alone
with the caution embodied in the "clear and present danger" test?
Note that the statutory policy cited by the state court sought to
preserve "the individual unorganized worker . . . free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor. .
,,107 This statute which the Washington Court relied upon in these terms did not
outlaw the inducing of an employer.'
It adopted an intermediate
position. It sought to preserve the worker free from the fact of restraint. It would seem, therefore, that the picketing would have to
pose an "imminent and immediate" threat of effectuating that prohibited restraint before being enjoined.
It is somewhat difficult, however, to picture Mr. Gazzam knuckling under to any but the most serious economic pressure, of a degree,
106. Gazzam v. Building Service Employees, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 490, 188 P.2d 97,
98 (1947), aff'd, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
107. Id.at 491, 492, 188 P.2d at 99.
108. But compare Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(B) (2) (Supp. 1952).
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say, that afflicted the ice company in Giboney.'0 9 From Mr. Justice
Minton's opinion emerges the picture of a determined employer, stubbornly adhering to what he sees as a point of principle, setting a steadfast course from the outset in resisting union overtures.
May it.be said that in Gazzam, the picketer, the picketed employer,
and the employees were so linked in circumstances that this picket line
actually threatened to touch off a cause-and-effect reaction which
would probably result in an effort by this employer to interfere with
these employees in their choice between union or nonunion? Although
that is the imminence which is requisite under the Court's "clear and
present danger" test, it is not present in the facts related in the opinions
of either court.
In any event, Gazzam seems to reflect to a serious degree a lack
of caution in determining the existence of "clear and present danger."
It appears to be incompatible with the Thornhill doctrine, not because
of any doctrinal clash, but because of the default involved in too casual
a concern for the presence of primary effectiveness connecting the policy favored to the activity, enjoined.
In Graham, on the other hand, primary effectiveness was apparently established. Criticism of the Court's handling of the issue of
danger turns instead upon the ultimate effect of the picket line on Virginia's open shop policy. Mr. Justice Burton spoke for the Court:
"Petitioners here engaged in more than the mere publication of
the fact that the job was not 100% union. Their picketing was
done at such a place [at the immediate nexus o of the dispute]
and in such a manner ["peaceful in appearance . . . no violence
and no use of abusive language." "] that, coupled with established
union policies and traditions,"' it caused the union men to stop
109. ". . . the picketing had an instantaneous adverse effect on Empire's business. It was reduced 85%. In this dilemma, Empire was faced with three alternatives: It could continue to sell ice to nonunion peddlers, in which event it would be
compelled to wage a fight for survival against overwhelming odds; it could stop
selling ice to nonunion peddlers thereby relieving itself from further conflict with
the union, in which event it would be subject to prosecution for crime and suits for
triple damages; it could invoke the protection of the law. The last alternative was
adopted.
Giboney v.
"Appellants' power with that of their allies was irresistible."
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 493, 503 (1949).
110. See Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
111. See Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192, 199 (1953).
112. See Richman Bros. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., 116
N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1953), in which the court imposed an injunction on the union's
nationwide picketing activities on the stated assumption that a "conspiracy" exists
among unions not to cross each others lines. Accord: Winkelman v. Teamsters
Union, 31 LAB. RI_. RFP. 2016 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1952) ("social electric eye detonating
the social atomic bomb of the universal agreement not to cross the Union's picket line,
wherever that picket line may be!'). See Jones, A Jursprudence of Epithets, supra

note 4, at 1044 n.88.
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immediate results of the picketing [the union men left the project]
demonstrated its potential effectiveness, unless enjoined, as a
practical means of putting pressure on the general contractor to
eliminate from further participation all nonunion men or all subcontractors employing nonunion men on the project." 113
Primary effectiveness was indeed demonstrated by the fact that
union men quit the project. But to justify an injunction does it suffice
to show only "immediate results" which indicate "potential effectiveness"? That hardly sounds like "clear and present danger" reasoning!
Cause and effect certainly don't have to march in locked step across
the record in order to establish danger, but "potential effectiveness"
seems far removed indeed from the Giboney requirement of "clear
danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restrained [the picketers]
would succeed in making that policy a dead letter." 114
It is difficult to read Mr. Justice Burton's account of what happened once the picketing started and come away with a feeling of urgent
concern that the state's policy against compulsory unionism is about
to be violated.
"It is undisputed that the picketing lasted from 8 a.m., September 25, until stopped by injunction the following noon...
The premises picketed were frequented by few except the construction workers. The project was in its earliest stages. . . . Two
union ironworkers or rodmen . . . never returned and the con-

tractor was delayed several days while seeking to replace them.
A nonunion plumber was assisted by a helper, who, oddly enough,
belonged to a printers union. The plumber did not stop work
but his helper left when the picketing began.
"The others present were six or seven laborers whose status
as union men was not clear. "They did not quit but the work on
the project as a whole came to a substantial standstill during the
week of September 25, because the principal activity then called
for was that of pouring concrete which required the services of
rodmen as well as those of laborers." 115
This rather casual scene seems to imply little more than a preliminary skirmish. For one thing, how do we know that the contractor
could not readily replace the union men? Surely, a trial court's finding of fact based on testimony should be required on that possibility
113. Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345
U.S. 192, 200, 201 (1953).
114. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949).
115. Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192, 199, 200 (1953).
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under circumstances such as these before it can be concluded with any
assurance that the contractor would either be tempted or forced to resort to an unlawful agreement. A couple of rodmen left because of the
picketing and "the contractor was delayed several days while seeking
to replace them." Here is a project in its earliest stages, some union
men leave, it takes several days to replace them, but, we may infer, they
are then replaced. Assuming that these facts are enough to constitute
a case of primary effectiveness on the ground that union men left the
project in response to the picketing, it does not seem there is very much
of a threat evidenced thus far at least that the picketing will be ultimately effective, that this contractor in Richmond, Virginia, will be
pressured by this picketing into actions violative of the state's open shop
policy. Yet these are the considerations which should concern the
Court. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Burton said that there was
present a "potential" of effectiveness. Yet any appeal for concurrence
has such a potential. The question of its control is indeed raised because of that potential; but it can hardly be said to be answered by it.
The foregoing analysis is based on the objective nature of the
"clear and present danger" reasoning by which, in a given case, having
appraised the issue of substantiality, the Court seeks only to determine
if in fact the approved policy is endangered. That kind of determination may be undertaken with reasonable assuredness of objectivity. It
is susceptible of factual demonstration. But in the course of his opinion,
Mr. Justice Burton asked a different kind of question, i. e., whether
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the finding by the state
court that the "conduct and circumstances occurring before and during
the picketing .

.

. demonstrated a purpose .

.

. that was in con-

flict with the Right to Work Statute." 'Il This is not the kind of inquiry which lends itself to objectivity. The intent of the picketer ought
not to be deemed relevant to a determination of whether his activity
impinges upon state policy.' 1 7 We have already seen that such comparative figures as those reflecting the impact of the picket line on the
employer's balance sheet are readily available.
It is hard to see that the state of the picketer's mind, as long as the
picketing is peaceful, has any evidentiary value in deciding if his activity is a danger to the policy to be protected. In addition to its essential irrelevance to the issue, what is now accepted as ancient history
in this field indicates without doubt that such "purpose" searching has
in the past led courts far afield. What is in the head of the picketer
116. Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192, 197 (1953) (italics added).
117. See Richardson, supra note 72, at 13 et seq.
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tends not to be nearly so important as what is in the head of the trier
of facts. It may be that this "purpose" terminology is actually expressive of no more than the Court's concern for the existence of objectively demonstrable facts. We may hope at least that it is not suggestive of that kind of state-of-mind inquiry which actually involves
subjective reactions to much more than factual connection of this activity to that policy.
But the Graham opinions are hardly reassuring in this regard.
Those opinions, majority and dissenting, afford a good example of
the briar. patch into which "purpose" searching can lead the Court.
In all fairness, it should be added that it was led into it by the trial
court's decree which framed the state's policy in subjective terms of
intent:
"[I]t appearing to the Court that the picketing complained of
was conducted . . . for aims, purposes and objectives in conflict
with the . . . laws of the State of Virginia and, therefore, illegal, . . . a permanent injunction is necessary.

But we may regret that the Supreme Court did not refuse to enter into
subjective conceptions of illegality based on "aims, purposes and objectives." It might have insisted instead upon the objectivity of its
"clear and present danger" reasoning as a measure of the state's injunction: did this picketing in fact threaten that policy? The welfare of the
state would thereby have been amply protected and the right to picket
preserved against premature injunction.
In any event, "purpose" searching went on apace. The union
official testified that the purpose of the picketing was to inform union
men that nonunion men were on the job. The contractor said no, the
purpose of the union was to get a "100% union" job. The trial court
then held that the picketing was for "purposes" in conflict with Virginia
statutes. Both purposes? Or just one? But, in the latter event, which
one? That asserted by the union official or that by the contractor?
The trial court did not say. Mr. Justice Burton declared, however,
that "the effect of the picketing was confirmatory of its purpose as
found by the trial court." But which purpose? If only one purpose
were deducible, there would be some point in saying the activity confirmed the intent. But it isn't very enlightening when we don't know
which of two purposes is confirmed. The trial court did use the plural,
"purposes," so I suppose it could be argued that both were illegal. But
118. Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen ?lumbers v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192, 195 (1953).
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in his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas set it out that a "purpose to deprive nonunion men of employment would make the picketing unlawful," whereas "a purpose to keep union men away from the job would
give the picketing constitutional protection." 9 Yet may it not be
asked if the two purposes are not in reality one? Isn't the purpose
("unlawful") to deprive nonunion men of employment the purpose
which prompts the purpose ("lawful") to keep union men away from
the job?
Unfortunately, "purpose" searching doesn't prove very purposeful. Semantics aside, the fact is that the state sought to preserve the
worker's freedom of association; the fact is that the Court felt it was
legitimate to protect that policy against this form of expression; the
fact is that it should not make any difference under "clear and present
danger" reasoning which purpose moved the picketers if actually they
threatened seriously to frustrate that policy.
Does not this analysis suggest that the practical administration of
labor law would be furthered by an objective rather than a subjective
test of allowability of picketing? This the Court appeared to recognize
in Giboney, and it seems that it would be well advised to return to the
surer ground of analysis indicated there. Inquiry would then be concerned with the following factors: (1) is avoidance of the supposed
evil (the effects to be anticipated from frustrating the policy) of real
consequence to the state's welfare? (2) if so, does this particular
picketing in fact threaten to effectuate it? In addition, it would seem
helpful if that second question were to be explored in terms of primary
and ultimate effectiveness.
Both Gazzam and Graham are unfortunate decisions. It is hard
to say that the Court observed the caution required of it by its "clear
and present danger" formula in linking the primary effectiveness of
the enjoined picketing to frustration of Washington's freedom-ofchoice or Virginia's open-shop policy. Further, it allowed itselfunnecessarily, it would seem-to become entangled in fruitless "purpose" searching. In view of these points of weakness in the Court's
analysis, we may hope that in a like situation the Court might (1)
reject both the state's injunction and its policy formulation in terms
of "purpose"; and (2) in doing so, make explicit its requirement of
objective demonstration of effectiveness. Its answer necessarily will
be based on its view of proximity in the individual case. But that
answer, as the justices would undoubtedly wish, might then be more
realistic and would certainly be less subjective.
119. Id. at 202.
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It is impossible to know if the Court has adopted as its shortrange policy a laissez faire policy toward the state's efforts to regulate
picketing. In any event, such a policy will be responsive to the facts
of each case because the only long-range policy the Court can afford in
this sensitive area of economic regulation was expressed in Thornhill.
It amounts to no more than the abiding caution of the "clear and present danger" concepts. But these are not to be thought insubstantial.
So long as the Court is careful in applying them, they assure both a
sound base for protection against intemperate or overly zealous attempts at control and an assurance of an effective area of legitimate
state and congressional regulatory freedom.
This, then, is a fluid area of policy formulation which will not
be contained by doctrinaire concepts. The one firm principle which
need not fluctuate is that this facet of freedom of expression should be
accorded the caution of its constitutional status. That caution entails
careful application of the evil-danger analysis to the facts of the particular case. While there is flexibility in the contemporary conception of what constitutes substantial evil, the Court should be unyielding
in the rigor of its requirement that the connective element of danger
be factually demonstrated and not allowed to be subverted by "spurious
findings of fact in a State Court." 120
In conclusion, therefore, the writer submits the following propositions as essential to a balanced picketing analysis consonant with the
practical administration of our labor laws:
First, constitutional protection of picketing as a right of expression is a proper recognition of the essence of that activity, which is, the
communication of ideas in an appeal to viewers for concurrence.
Second, constitutional protection does not, however, render picketing immune to reasonable regulation in terms of peaceful means and
lawful ends. Economic consequences attendant upon a successful
picket line, which do not alter its essential nature as protected expression, do constitute factors which must be considered in determining
what regulation of picketing is to be deemed reasonable.
picketing
Third, policy formulations advanced in justification of
interest.
injunctions should be required to reflect a substantial public
Fourth, preference of such a policy over a claim of constitutional
has been
privilege should result (1) only after the picketing challenged
Dairies, Inc., 312
120. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor
U.S. 287, 299 (1941).
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demonstrated to have primary effectiveness, and (2) only if that effectiveness has also been shown further to be so causally linked to the
specific policy as to indicate that coexistence of this picketing and that
policy cannot reasonably be expected.
Fifth, in weighing lawfulness of purpose, the Court should avoid
a test of legality which is based on the intent of the picketer. The
unwholesome kind of hairsplitting and unreal distinction suggested by
the Graham opinions is inevitable if the basis be accepted that lawfulness
depends on what the picketer thinks rather than on what he does.
Whether the particular policy accepted by the Court is seriously threatened by the conduct of the picketer is an objectively measurable fact;
it also comprehends what is legitimately objectionable to the state or to
Congress. The practical administration of our labor law, as well as
general respect for it, would be well served by the Court if it does in
this regard what it did in the earlier group of post-Thornhill decisions:
set the fact of the activity against the policy, and ignore the picketer's
state of mind.
Although the First Amendment ought to be held to protect any
form of expression that man may happen to devise to express his religious, political or social ideas, it would not seem to make much practical
difference to judicial administration in the Court's picketing cases
whether the above propositions were to be posited upon an independent
constitutional right to picket or upon a derivative right based in freedom
of speech. In either event, the qualification of "clear and present danger" reasoning would be applicable, and these propositions involve no
more than applications of the abiding caution of that reasoning.
Although convinced of their efficacy, the writer has no illusions
as to the significance of these several suggestions. Certainly, if
adopted, they will result in no dramatic shifts of doctrine. Indeed,
they seem to do little more than confirm the Supreme Court's present
doctrine and add to it a note of caution in application. Vested interests of neither labor nor management are apt to be promoted by them
except insofar as each is benefited by the kind of clarification which results in greater predictability of judicial action. If followed, they
would enhance the possibility of an orderly and predictable pattern of
judicial accommodation of what are customarily turbulent wants and
needs to contemporary societal necessities. They would do this without
discarding or enervating the constitutional right to picket and without
trenching on proper state or federal legislative prerogatives in the
distribution of economic power.

